Guided by questions of scope, this paper provides an overview of what is known about both the scope and, consequently, the limits of Gödel’s famous first incompleteness theorem.

A short biography of Johannes von Kries, followed by a bibliography of his works, containing more than 70 previously unknown works.

Frank Quinn of Jaffe-Quinn fame worked out the basics of his own account of how mathematical practice should be described and analyzed, partly by historical comparisons with 19th century mathematics, partly by an analysis of contemporary mathematics and its pedagogy. Despite his claim that for this task, "professional philosophers seem as irrelevant as Aristotle is to modern physics," this philosophy talk will provide a critical summary of his main observations and arguments. The goal is to inject some of Quinns remarks (...) to the current conversation on mathematical practice. [1] Jaffe, Arthur, Quinn, Frank. "Theoretical Mathematics: Towards a synthesis of mathematics and theoretical physics," Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society NS 29:1, 113. [2] Quinn, Frank. Contributions to a Science of Mathematics, manuscript, 98pp. [3] Quinn, Frank. "A revolution in mathematics? What really happened a century ago and why it matters today," Notices American Mathematical Society 59:1 31-37. (shrink)

While Gödel’s first theorem remains valid under substitution of various provability predicates, Gödel’s second theorem does not. This is one reason to label G1 as “extensional” but to call G2 “intensional.” Although this asymmetry between G1 and G2 is known for long, no satisfying account of G2’s intensionality has been put forward. After briefly reviewing the discussion so far, the paper presents a new analysis based on two observations. First, the underestimated role of provable closure under modus. Provable closure under (...) modus ponens—usually listed as the second derivability condition—or similar requirements, do not get much attention since their proof isn’t perceived as much of challenge. Closer inspection shows, however, that the requirement of provable closure under modus ponens interacts differently with different formalized proof predicates and has thus a direct bearing on the discussion of G2’s intensionality. Second, in order to establish the co-extensionality of various proof predicates and hence the extensionality of G1, the role informal consistency assumption play goes largely unnoticed and unanalyzed. Closer inspection shows, however, that if such informal consistency assumptions are being made precise, the former distinction between G1 and G2 becomes blurry and G2’s intensionality can be made go away. Both observation then support the thesis that the traditional extensional/intensional distinction is not as robust as the received view believed it to be. (shrink)

The ethics of artificial intelligence is a widely discussed topic. There are numerous initiatives that aim to develop the principles and guidance to ensure that the development, deployment and use of AI are ethically acceptable. What is generally unclear is how organisations that make use of AI understand and address these ethical issues in practice. While there is an abundance of conceptual work on AI ethics, empirical insights are rare and often anecdotal. This paper fills the gap in our current (...) understanding of how organisations deal with AI ethics by presenting empirical findings collected using a set of ten case studies and providing an account of the cross-case analysis. The paper reviews the discussion of ethical issues of AI as well as mitigation strategies that have been proposed in the literature. Using this background, the cross-case analysis categorises the organisational responses that were observed in practice. The discussion shows that organisations are highly aware of the AI ethics debate and keen to engage with ethical issues proactively. However, they make use of only a relatively small subsection of the mitigation strategies proposed in the literature. These insights are of importance to organisations deploying or using AI, to the academic AI ethics debate, but maybe most valuable to policymakers involved in the current debate about suitable policy developments to address the ethical issues raised by AI. (shrink)

The increasing use of information and communication technologies (ICT) to help facilitate neuroscience adds a new level of complexity to the question of how ethical issues of such research can be identified and addressed. Current research ethics practice, based on ethics reviews by institutional review boards (IRB) and underpinned by ethical principalism, has been widely criticised and even called ‘imperialist’. In this paper, we develop an alternative way of approaching ethics in neuro-ICT research, based on discourse ethics, which implements (...) responsible research and innovation through dialogues. We draw on our work in Ethics Support, using the Human Brain Project as empirical evidence of the viability of this approach. (shrink)

An increase in the number of companies that publish corporate social responsibility (CSR) statements, and a rise in their ‘sustainability’ research, reflects a growing acceptance that broad ethical considerations are key for any type of company. However, little is known about how companies consider moral objectives for their research and development (R&D) activities, or the basis upon which these activities are chosen. This research involves qualitative investigation into Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industry, (...) comprising 30 in-depth, pan-European interviews with key personnel in the industry, and focus groups with employees at 14 different companies. Through investigation of the ‘responsible’ activities these companies currently undertake, we shed light on the types of moral goals they set and their underlying ethical standpoints. By reviewing both the responsible innovation and sustainability discourses, and presenting phenomenological evidence, we demonstrate that companies have adopted some aspects of RRI, even though it might not be recognised as such. Our findings indicate that these innovators recognise some of the ethical and societal concerns associated with their activities but their approach is often piecemeal; primary focus is upon the most immediate issues and on legal compliance, to the detriment of broader societal issues and wider challenges. We recommend explicit mechanisms that draw upon established ethical thought and practical academic work to improve companies' abilities to carry out their sustainability activities, and incorporate them into a responsible business strategy. We conclude with recommendations for innovators, corporate research and development, and policy. (shrink)

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to give an introduction to the special issue by providing background on the ETHICOMP conference series and a discussion of its role in the academic debate on ethics and computing. It provides the context that influenced the launch of the conference series and highlights its unique features. Finally, it provides an overview of the papers in the special issues. Design/methodology/approach – The paper combines an historical account of ETHICOMP and a review (...) of the existing papers. Findings – ETHICOMP is one of the well-established conference series focused on ethical issues of information and computing. Its special features include: multidisciplinary and diversity of contributors and contributions; explicit outreach to professionals whose work is to design, build, deploy and maintain specific computing applications in the world at large; creation of knowledge that is accessible and relevant across fields and disciplines; intention of making a practical difference to development, use and policy of computing principles and artefacts; and creation of an inclusive, supportive and nurturing community across traditional knowledge silos. Originality/value – The paper is the first one to explicitly define the nature of ETHICOMP which is an important building block in the future development of the conference series and will contribute to the further self-definition of the ETHICOMP community. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Despotie der Vernunft? Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant HegelBernd LudwigArmin Adam. Despotie der Vernunft? Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant Hegel. Reihe praktische Philosophie. Műnchen: Karl Alber Verlag, 1999. Pp. 304. Cloth, DM 74.00.Eine Philosophie der Vernunft bedroht die Freiheit, weil der Versuch einer konsequenten Begründung der politischen Institutionen aus Freiheit und Vernunft den Absolutismus ebendieser Institutionen begünstigt (285). Das ist die These, die Armin Adams politikwissenschaftliche Habilitationsschrift anhand einer Analyse der politischen (...) Philosophie der Aufklärung, genauer, anhand der Lektüre von Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant und Hegel expliziert: Hobbes' individualistische Revolution des Naturrechts führt zum Absolutismus des Leviathan, Rousseaus Ideal der Volkssouveränität [End Page 591] zur Mystik der volonté générale, Kants Verrechtlichung des Politischen zur Leugnung des Widerstandsrechts und Hegels Pathos der Freiheit schließlich zum Mythos des Staates. Bei allen vier Autoren wird der aus der Freiheit geborene Staat vor den Gerichtshof der Vernunft zitiert und am Ende steht die Aufhebung (Hobbes) oder die radikale Umdeutung (Rousseau bis Hegel) des Begriffs der Freiheit, welche die ursprünglichen Freiheits-Intuitionen vergessen macht.Deutungen, welche die Aufklärung an ihren befreienden Leistungen messen, sind für Adam zwar genauso berechtigt wie jene, die ihre "dunkle Seite" (288) thematisieren. Ihm geht es gleichwohl darum, gerade die letztere nicht als bloß-akzidentell zu begreifen, sondern vielmehr die Kritik der philosophischen Aufklärung "aus dem Inneren der philosophischen Arbeit" zu leisten (288) und so der Apologie der Aufklärung eine "zweite Geschichte" zur Seite zu stellen.]Ausgangspunkt für die Politische Philosophie der Aufklärung wie auch für Adams Auseinandersetzung mit ihr ist die Vertragstheorie des Staates (22 ff.). Bei Hobbes und Rousseau findet die politische Gegenwart in der "Urszene des Vertrages" ihre Legitimitätsquelle (288). Erst mit Kant (und Hegel) wird der Vertrag verpflichtungstheoretisch entlastet, als Scharnierstück zwischen Motivation und Obligation entbehrlich, weil eine reichere praktische Philosophie die Rede von der Pflicht zum Staat rechtfertigen kann (159 ff.). Hobbes setzt noch auf die individuelle ökonomische Rationalität als movens zum Staat. Die Freiheit ist aber nur das Prinzip der Herrschaftsbegründung, sie wird durch das Prinzip der Souveränität in die Vorgeschichte des politischen Körpers verbannt (44, 70). Rousseau behält die Hobbessche Interessenlogik bei, doch durch die Konstitution der volonté générale wird der Selbsterhaltungswille des Einzelnen in den Willen zur Erhaltung des Gemeinwesens transformiert (94). Von der Herrschaftsbegründung verschiebt sich der Blick auf die Herrschaftspraxis (98). Entsprechend schwankt Rousseau zwischen einer Interpretation seiner volonté générale als bien commun(Économie Politique) und als volonté de tous (Du Contrat social). (104 ff.) Die Freiheit im Staat wird mit der Vernunft identifiziert und so der bloßen Willkür entgegengesetzt, der Gesellschaftsvertrag ist nicht mehr nur die Legitimationsgrundlage der Herrschaft, sondern "die Stunde Null" des Projekts der politischen Volkserziehung durch Institutionen. (133) Kant endlich löst die Pflicht vom Nutzen (168) und kann so auf die individuelle Freiwilligkeit, d. i. auf jegliche kontraktualistische Herrschaftslegitimation verzichten: Das "exeundum e statu naturali" wird zur Pflicht und der Vertrag degeneriert zur (moralphilosophischen) Idee (175): "Die Abkehr vom Prinzip empirischer Freiwilligkeit zugunsten des moralphilosophischen Prinzips der Universalisierung von Freiheit ersetzt auch die empirischen Subjekte der Staatsbegründung durch die Vernunft selbst" (178). Hegel verabschiedet dann endgültig die "epistemische und moralische Priorität des Individuums" (246) indem sein Konzept der Sittlichkeit es ihm erlaubt, die Freiwilligkeit in der "substanziellen Freiheit" aufgehoben zu sehen (241). Der "fundamentalistisch-kritische Gestus" der Aufklärung wird durch das Vertrauen in die Wirklichwerdung des Vernünftigen ersetzt. Indem Hegel das Recht als entwickelte Idee der Freiheit versteht, bildet seine Rechtsphilosophie den Gipfel einer politischen Philosophie der Aufklärung (252). [End Page 592]Adams Buch will ein Korrektiv für jenen Aufklärungsoptimismus liefern, der mit dem Zeitalter der Vernunft das Ende der Geschichte eingeläutet sieht. Ohne Frage: Das Ideal einer "vollendeten Herrschaft der Vernunft" (289), wie es Adam als Leitmotiv bei dem von ihm behandelten "Quartetts" entdecken will, überforderte jede menschliche Form der Politik. Aber möglicherweise wird man zumindest einigen dieser Autoren eher gerecht, wenn man ihr Unternehmen gerade umgekehrt als den kritischen Versuch begreift, menschliche Herrschaft vom Glorienschein arkaner Wahrheiten zu entkleiden... (shrink)

A famous passage in the first Critique (A 557 f.) often gives rise to the belief that Kant had not yet delivered a full treatment of freedom in 1781 and intended to shift this treatment to future writings. However, a closer inspection of the passage reveals that, to the contrary, Kant claims that due to the limitations of human reason his critical account of freedom given thus far must be considered complete. And indeed, this account reappears unchanged in the Groundwork. (...) When considered in this light, not only do the exact achievements of the first Critique concerning Kant’s doctrine of freedom become evident, but so too does the further development of this doctrine. In 1785, the Groundwork supplies a new conceptual link between freedom and the moral law (and with it an explanation of the possibility of categorical imperatives). And thanks to this very link, Kant is able, in the second Critique (1787/88), to remedy a ‘dogmatic’ mistake (discovered by a reviewer in 1786) in his 1781/85 account of freedom. (shrink)

THIS paper consists essentially of three parts. The first part argues the case for construing Nietzsche's remarks about Übermenschlichkeit as endorsing some specific set of character traits, of "virtues" if you like. To be an Übermensch, on this reading, is to possess or exhibit certain traits of character, traits which in the typical case are associated with notions of self-overcoming, sublimation, creativity, and self-perfection. An Übermensch, construed in this way, expresses Nietzsche's vision of the human ideal, of what human beings (...) should or might be like. In this sense Nietzsche merely continues the ancient project of articulating the human ideal, the conception of human perfectibility. Although Nietzsche's answer may appear to be shockingly different, the project of articulating a human ideal is scarcely radical. The project qua project is no different than that of Plato or Aristotle, the Stoics, Spinoza or Kant. For Plato, the philosopher-king represents the ideal of human self-perfection; for Aristotle megalopsychic man conjoined with the life of contemplation; for the Stoics apatheia and right reason; for Spinoza the intellectual amor dei was a necessary and perhaps a sufficient condition for human liberation; for Kant, the genuinely moral person qualifies as the human ideal, the person whose actions are always and only governed by the categorical imperative, although Kant would probably have called such a will a "holy" will rather than a human one. (shrink)

In his critical writings before 1786 Kant argues that trans¬cendental freedom is a problem for speculative philosophy – and that this problem was solved satisfyingly in 1781 by his own Transcendental Idealism. In the Groundwork, 1785, after having linked the moral law inseparably to transcendental freedom by his discovery of autonomy, Kant claimed that the moral law can be deduced from freedom thus established. But in May 1786 he was persuaded by a review-article that his 1781/85-deduction of freedom was (...) incompatible with his critical philosophy. Hence Kant had to shift the epistemic priority from freedom to the moral law. He thus replaced the deduction of freedom and morality given in the Third Part of the Groundwork by his Doctrine of the “fact of pure practical reason” in the 2nd Critique. By this move Kant established an entirely new and dominant role for practical reason in metaphysics, a role which already shows up in the second edition of the 1st Critique – and which leads to Kant′s unprecedented conception of a “praktisch-dogmatische Metaphyik” in the 1790ties. (shrink)

The doctrine is unquestionably Nietzsche’s most puzzling, and it has been interpreted in two distinguishable ways: as a cosmology or an ethical imperative. The cosmological basis of the doctrine can be found only in Nietzsche’s literary estate, the Nachlass, in notes not designated for publication. The normative import of the doctrine of eternal recurrence, on the other hand, finds articulation in virtually every work written by Nietzsche after 1881. It is of some importance to note in this connection that all (...) Nietzsche scholars have taken the cosmological formulation to be the clear one, mistakenly I believe, and have ignored the fact that Nietzsche himself suppressed it. (shrink)

PurposeThe paper aims to explore future and emerging information and communication technologies. It gives a general overview of the social consequences and ethical issues arising from technologies that can currently be reasonably expected. This overview is used to present recommendations and integrate these in a framework of responsible innovation.Design/methodology/approachThe identification of emerging ICTs and their ethical consequences is based on the review and analysis if several different bodies of literature. The individual features of the ICTs and the ethical issues (...) identified this way are then aggregated and analysed.FindingsThe paper outlines the 11 ICTs identified. Some of the shared features that are likely to have social relevance include an increase in natural interaction, the invisibility of technology, direct links between humans and technology, detailed models and data of humans and an increasing autonomy of technology that may lead to power over the user. Ethical issues include several current topics such as privacy, data protection, intellectual property and digital divides. New problems may include changes to the way humans are perceived and the role of humans and technology in society. This includes changing power structures and different ways of treating humans.Research limitations/implicationsThe paper presents a piece of foresight research which cannot claim exact knowledge of the future. However, by developing a detailed understanding of possible futures it provides an important basis for current decisions relating to future technology development and governance.Practical implicationsThe paper spells out a range of recommendations for both policy makers and researchers/industry. These refer to the framework within which technology is developed and how such a framework could be designed to allow the development of ethical reflexivity.Social implicationsThe work described here is likely to influence EU policy on ICT research and technology research and innovation more broadly. This may have implications for the type of technologies funded and broad implications for the social use of emerging technologies.Originality/valueThe paper presents a novel and important broad view of the future of ICTs that is required in order to inform current policy decisions. (shrink)

This article seeks to establish a link between the field of business ethics and information ethics by exploring the connection between responsibility and the Internet from an economic perspective. This link finds its expression in the moral theory of Discourse Ethics as suggested by German philosophers such as Juergen Habermas and Karl‐Otto Apel. The term responsibility points in the direction of communication and therefore leads easily to discourse ethics. The economy in general and most economic practices also seem to be (...) intimately linked to questions of responsibility. The growing spread and importance of the Internet poses new challenges and problems but also creates new possibilities for ethics as well as for the economy. Here several of these new developments are analysed and their impact on ethics as well as economy assessed. Consequences for the use and development of information technology are considered. (shrink)

Despite its successes, to date Artificial Intelligence (AI) is still characterized by a number of shortcomings with regards to different application domains and goals. These limitations are arguably both conceptual (e.g., related to the underlying theoretical models, such as symbolic vs.connectionist), and operational (e.g., related to robustness and ability to generalize). Biologically inspired AI, and more specifically brain-inspired AI, promises to provide further biological aspects beyond those that are already traditionally included in AI, making it possible to assess and possibly (...) overcome some of its present shortcomings. This article examines some conceptual, technical, and ethical issues raised by the development and use of brain-inspired AI. Against this background, the paper asks whether there is anything ethically unique about brain-inspired AI. The aim of the paper is to introduce a method that has a heuristic nature and that can be applied to identify and address the ethical issues arising from brain-inspired AI (and from AI more generally). The conclusion resulting from the application of this method is that, compared to traditional AI, brain-inspired AI raises new foundational ethical issues and some new practical ethical issues, and exacerbates some of the issues raised by traditional AI. (shrink)

BackgroundInaccurate, false or incomplete research publications may mislead readers including researchers and decision-makers. It is therefore important that such problems are identified and rectified promptly. This usually involves collaboration between the research institutions and academic journals involved, but these interactions can be problematic.MethodsThese recommendations were developed following discussions at World Conferences on Research Integrity in 2013 and 2017, and at a specially convened 3-day workshop in 2016 involving participants from 7 countries with expertise in publication ethics and research integrity. The (...) recommendations aim to address issues surrounding cooperation and liaison between institutions and journals about possible and actual problems with the integrity of reported research arising before and after publication.ResultsThe main recommendations are that research institutions should: develop mechanisms for assessing the integrity of reported research that are distinct from processes to determine whether individual researchers have committed misconduct;release relevant sections of reports of research integrity or misconduct investigations to all journals that have published research that was investigated;take responsibility for research performed under their auspices regardless of whether the researcher still works at that institution or how long ago the work was done;work with funders to ensure essential research data is retained for at least 10 years.Journals should: respond to institutions about research integrity cases in a timely manner;have criteria for determining whether, and what type of, information and evidence relating to the integrity of research reports should be passed on to institutions;pass on research integrity concerns to institutions, regardless of whether they intend to accept the work for publication;retain peer review records for at least 10 years to enable the investigation of peer review manipulation or other inappropriate behaviour by authors or reviewers.ConclusionsVarious difficulties can prevent effective cooperation between academic journals and research institutions about research integrity concerns and hinder the correction of the research record if problems are discovered. While the issues and their solutions may vary across different settings, we encourage research institutions, journals and funders to consider how they might improve future collaboration and cooperation on research integrity cases. (shrink)

In recent years, the rights of patients have assumed a more pivotal role in international discussion. Stricter laws on the protection of patients place greater priority on the perspective and the status of patients. The purpose of this study is to emphasize ethical aspects in communication, the role of patient advocates as contacts for the concerns and suggestions of patients, and how many problems of ethics disappear when communication is highlighted. We reviewed 680 documented cases of consultation in a 10-year (...) period of patient advocates’ activity at a big German university hospital with 1,300 beds. On the basis of this extensive material, the article will focus on the intersection of the advocate’s work with the problems of patients in hospitals. Deficits in the level of communication between health care professionals and patients were frequently uncovered. Patients primarily complain about the lack of dialogue and empathy. Middle-aged patients consulted the patients’ advocate disproportionately more often. Measured against this baseline, the group of 65 and older complained less frequently. Besides complaints the advocate was asked in more than one-third of all cases for information about medical matters, hospital regulations or administrative problems. Patients obviously see the advocate as a well-connected and ideally unbiased contact person for uncertainties concerning their malady or a potential stay in hospital. Those seeking help often set hope in the information given by the voluntary patient representative. It should be highly recommended for every German hospital to establish the position of a patient advocate. Furthermore, patients can profit from regular exchange between the advocate and the Ethics Committee, also, to help ensure that their rights are taken into account and implemented in an ethically desirable context. (shrink)

In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology, connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.